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Trust Restoration in International Military Missions

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Abstract

Establishing and maintaining trust between military organizations and the local population being assisted is considered to be integral to the success of international military operations. A lack of trust in military organizations on the part of the indigenous population may strain the relationship between these two groups, a situation which may, in turn, jeopardize mission success and undermine the military's ability to provide support and assistance to the indigenous population, as well as increase a volatile security situation on the ground. Recent research in the organizational psychology literature has found that in some cases (e.g., an integrity-based trust violation), denial of responsibility is a more effective trust repair mechanism (vs. apology), whereas in other cases (e.g., a competence-based trust violation), an apology is a more effective trust repair mechanism (vs. denial). Still other research has found that an apology is more effective than denial in restoring image and cooperation. This study examined the applicability of these findings to complex international military engagements using a scenario-based experimental paradigm. Results demonstrated that the best trust-related outcomes occur in the absence of trust violations. However, in contrast to previous research, where trust violations did occur, it appears that the most effective trust repair strategy is an apology rather than a denial, although it is important to note that the means for trust measures following either repair strategy remained low in comparison to no trust violation (i.e., the control condition).

Résumé

L'établissement et le maintien de la confiance entre les organisations militaires et les populations locales auxquelles elles viennent en aide sont considérés comme essentiels à la réussite des opérations militaires internationales. Le manque de confiance de la population locale envers les organisations militaires peut créer des tensions dans les relations entre les deux groupes et, du même coup, mettre en péril la mission, affecter la capacité des militaires d'offrir du soutien et de l'aide à la population locale et accroître les défis posés par le contexte de sécurité instable sur le terrain. Selon des études récemment publiées en psychologie organisationnelle, dans certains cas (p. ex., un manquement à l'intégrité), la dénégation serait un mécanisme de restauration de la confiance plus efficace que la présentation d'excuses, tandis que dans d'autres cas (p. ex., un manquement à la compétence), la présentation d'excuses serait plus efficace que la dénégation. D'autres études indiquent que la présentation d'excuses est plus efficace que la dénégation pour le rétablissement de l'image et de la coopération. La présente étude visait à évaluer l'applicabilité de ces observations aux engagements militaires internationaux complexes à l'aide d'un paradigme expérimental fondé sur des scénarios. Les observations ont montré que les meilleurs résultats pour la confiance sont obtenus en l'absence de bris de confiance. Cependant, contrairement à ce qui a été noté dans les recherches précédentes, où il y a eu des bris de confiance, il semble que la meilleure stratégie pour rétablir la confiance est la présentation d'excuses et non la dénégation, bien qu'il importe de préciser que les valeurs moyennes des mesures de la confiance restaient peu élevées après l'une ou l'autre des stratégies de restauration de la confiance comparativement aux scénarios sans bris de confiance (groupe témoin).

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Executive summary

Trust Restoration in International Military Missions:

[Ritu Gill; Megan M. Thompson; Angela R. Febbraro; Marissa Barnes]; DRDC Toronto TR 2010-151; Defence R&D Canada – Toronto; October 2010.

Introduction or background: Recent research in the organizational psychology literature has found that in some cases (e.g., an integrity–based trust violation), denial of responsibility is a more effective trust repair mechanism (vs. apology), whereas in other cases (e.g., a competence-based trust violation), an apology is a more effective trust repair mechanism (vs. denial). Still other research has found that an apology is more effective than denial in restoring image and cooperation, although type of violation was not explored. The applicability of findings from the organizational psychology literature to complex international military engagements was explored in this study.

Participants and Method: Civilian participants (N = 175) read a scenario and imagined themselves as a local citizen of a fictional country, Safia, which was depicted as experiencing conflict due to the rising power of a local terrorist organization. A fictional military, Massey military, had entered Safia to deal with the terrorist threat and to re-build Safia by providing improved health care and road/travel conditions, an educational system, and political infrastructure. Embedded within the scenario were the trust violation and trust repair manipulations. Participants either experienced the competence-based trust violation manipulation, the integrity-based trust violation manipulation, or the no trust violation (control). Furthermore, participants experienced the apology trust repair, the denial trust repair, or the no trust repair (control). Participants completed several questionnaires assessing manipulation checks, expectations of the military, and willingness to trust the military.

Results: Consistent with expectations, initial (baseline) trust was found to be significantly higher than trust assessed post violation, indicating that allegations of untrustworthy behavior were sufficient to violate initial trust. Results also demonstrated that the best trust-related outcomes occurred in the absence of trust violations. However, in contrast to previous research, where trust violations did occur, it appeared that the most effective trust repair strategy was an apology rather than a denial, although it is important to note that the means for trust measures following either repair strategy remained low in comparison to no trust violation (i.e., the control condition). However, our findings are consistent with past research examining the effectiveness of apologies in restoring cooperation and image, as well as previous research on improving trust after a trust violation has occurred.

Significance: Regardless of the type of trust violation, the most effective trust repair strategy appears to be an apology rather than a denial. Anecdotal evidence suggests that an apology may be more effective than denial when used outside of the research context and within the "real world." Indeed, when the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) apologized to the mother of a man who they had unintentionally killed by taser, the mother said that "the apologies given by the authorities will help begin the healing process" (CBC, April 1, 2010). Similarly, within the context of military international engagements, apologies have been given by the former top American military commander, General Stanley McChrystal, to the local Afghan population in an

attempt to make amends for civilian casualties (The Ottawa Citizen, February 23, 2010). Although the effects of the apology aided the healing process (CBC, April 1, 2010), the effects of an apology on trust restoration are not yet known.

Future plans: Future research needs to continue to further explore the effectiveness of an apology in repairing trust in order to determine the robustness of the present findings and given the early stages of this research. Furthermore, examining trust restoration with military participants will provide insight into trust restoration strategies from their perspective, allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of trust restoration from both the military and indigenous population perspectives.

Sommaire

Trust Restoration in International Military Missions:

[Ritu Gill; Megan M. Thompson; Angela R. Febbraro; Marissa Barnes]; DRDC Toronto TR 2010-151; R & D pour la défense Canada – Toronto; October 2010.

Introduction ou contexte : Selon des études récemment publiées en psychologie organisationnelle, dans certains cas (p. ex., un manquement à l'intégrité), la dénégation serait un mécanisme de restauration de la confiance plus efficace que la présentation d'excuses, tandis que dans d'autres cas (p. ex., un manquement à la compétence), la présentation d'excuses serait plus efficace que la dénégation. D'autres études indiquent que la présentation d'excuses est plus efficace que la dénégation pour le rétablissement de l'image et de la coopération, bien que le type de bris de confiance n'ait pas été examiné. La présente étude visait à évaluer l'applicabilité des observations de la littérature en psychologie organisationnelle aux engagements militaires internationaux complexes.

Participants et méthodologie : Nous avons demandé à des participants civils (n = 175) de lire un scénario et de se mettre dans la peau d'un citoyen d'un pays fictif (le Safia), présenté comme étant aux prises avec un conflit dû à la montée en puissance d'une organisation terroriste locale. Une organisation militaire fictive d'un autre pays (le Massey), était au Safia pour contrer la menace terroriste et reconstruire le pays en offrant de meilleurs soins de santé, en améliorant les conditions routières, en facilitant les déplacements, en établissant un système d'éducation et en fournissant une infrastructure politique. Les scénarios comportaient des manipulations visant à briser la confiance et à la restaurer. Les participants ont été soumis à une manipulation entraînant un bris de la confiance à l'égard de la compétence, à une manipulation entraînant un bris de la confiance à l'égard de l'intégrité ou à aucun bris de confiance (groupe témoin). De plus, les participants ont été soumis à une manipulation visant à restaurer la confiance par la présentation d'excuses ou par la dénégation, ou à aucune manipulation de restauration de la confiance (groupe témoin). Les participants ont rempli plusieurs questionnaires visant à évaluer les manipulations, les attentes positives à l'endroit des militaires et la disposition à faire confiance aux militaires.

Résultats : Conformément aux attentes, le degré de confiance était beaucoup plus élevé au départ qu'après le bris de confiance, ce qui montre que des allégations de comportement indigne de confiance étaient suffisantes pour briser cette confiance. Nos observations ont montré que les meilleurs résultats pour la confiance sont obtenus en l'absence de bris de confiance. Cependant, contrairement à ce qui a été noté dans les recherches précédentes, où il y a eu des bris de confiance, il semble que la meilleure stratégie pour rétablir la confiance est la présentation d'excuses et non la dénégation, bien qu'il importe de préciser que les valeurs moyennes des mesures de la confiance restaient peu élevées après l'une ou l'autre des stratégies de restauration de la confiance comparativement aux scénarios sans bris de confiance (groupe témoin). Nos observations concordent avec celles d'études antérieures ayant porté sur l'efficacité de la présentation d'excuses pour le rétablissement de la coopération et de l'image ainsi que sur l'amélioration de la confiance après un bris de confiance.

Importance : Peu importe le type de bris de confiance, la stratégie la plus efficace pour rétablir la confiance semble être la présentation d'excuses et non la dénégation. Certaines observations portent à croire que la présentation d'excuses est plus efficace que la dénégation en dehors d'un contexte de recherche, dans le « vrai monde ». Dans les faits, quand la Gendarmerie royale du Canada (GRC) a présenté ses excuses à la mère d'un homme accidentellement tué par des décharges de Taser administrées par des agents de la GRC, la mère a déclaré que les excuses l'aideraient à entreprendre le processus de guérison (CBC, 2010). De même, dans le contexte des engagements militaires internationaux, le général Stanley McChrystal, commandant des forces américaines en Afghanistan, s'est excusé auprès de la population afghane pour les pertes civiles au pays (Ottawa Citizen, 2010). Bien que la présentation d'excuses ait favorisé le processus de guérison (CBC, 2010), ses effets sur la restauration de la confiance restent inconnus.

Recherches futures : D'autres études doivent approfondir l'efficacité de la présentation d'excuses pour la restauration de la confiance afin d'établir la validité de cette observation, étant donné que la recherche dans ce secteur en est à ses tous débuts. De plus, l'examen de la restauration de la confiance chez les participants militaires permettra de mieux comprendre les stratégies de restauration de la confiance de leur point de vue et, en bout de ligne, d'avoir une compréhension plus globale de la restauration de la confiance, tant du point de vue des militaires que de celui des populations locales.

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1   Introduction

The need to better understand the relations between military organizations and indigenous populations being assisted has become apparent over the years, in particular since the militaries of many nations have entered complex theatres of operations, such as Kosovo, Bosnia, Africa, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The lessons learned from these post-Cold War missions have indicated that traditional military approaches remain important, but are not sufficient to ensure operational success (Olson & Gregorian, 2007; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Simms, 2008). Along with establishing security, other key goals include providing humanitarian relief, contributing to development, and establishing or reinstating good governance (Thompson & Gill, 2009). With militaries providing a wider variety of support and assistance to indigenous populations than in previous eras, an increasing number of opportunities arise for various types of interactions to occur between members of these two groups. For the military, challenges associated with interfacing with host nation populations may arise, stemming, for example, from potentially significant cultural differences between the military operating in a host nation and the indigenous community of the host nation receiving military assistance (Azari, Dandeker, & Greenberg, 2010). Such cultural differences, in turn, may affect the development and maintenance of trust that an indigenous population has for military forces operating in their region.

Indigenous populations receiving support from (non-local) military organizations have often initially responded to such assistance with trust and support; however, over time, a decrease in trust and support has sometimes been observed, for example, as has been found in Afghanistan (The Senlis Council, 2007; also see van der Kloet, 2006). This shift in trust and support for military organizations may be attributed to deliberate or inadvertent errors and missteps, or to trust violations, made by military organizations, and may encourage the indigenous population to direct their support to local terrorist organizations instead (The Senlis Council, 2007; van der Kloet, 2006). A lack of trust in military organizations on the part of the indigenous population may strain the relationship between these two groups, a situation which may, in turn, jeopardize mission success and undermine the military's ability to provide support and assistance to the indigenous population, as well as increase a volatile security situation on the ground. Trust has been suggested to play a vital role in the success of international military missions (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007; Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008; van der Kloet, 2006). Thus, the goal of this study was to examine trust, and, in particular, the dynamics of trust restoration between military organizations and the indigenous population receiving military assistance.

2   Trust

Trust is generally defined as "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other party will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party" (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995, p. 712). It has been referred to as the "single most important element of a good working relationship" (Fisher & Brown, 1988, p. 107). Trust often involves demonstrations of competence, benevolence, and integrity, depending upon the situation (Mayer et al., 1995; see also Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Trust is assumed to be critical in situations that are characterized by interdependence, uncertainty, ambiguity, and risk (Mayer et al., 1995). Theorists argue that it is under these conditions that real trust occurs (e.g., Mishra, 1996). In the organizational psychology literature, the presence of trust has been found to offer several benefits; for instance, trust promotes the ability to establish new and maintain existing associations (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Mayer et al., 1995), improves job attitudes, and increases organizational commitment and performance, as well as cooperation (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Greater trust also reduces the likelihood of exploiting another's vulnerabilities (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Mayer et al., 1995). When trust is present, people are less observant to signs of inconsistency in another's speech or behavior, and thus fewer opportunities exist for disconfirming information (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995). Higher levels of trust are also associated with greater feelings of shared identity and increased efforts to promote the welfare of the group (Brewer & Miller, 1996; Hinds & Mortenson, 2005).

Surprisingly few studies have examined how trust develops (see Pillutla, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2003), and still fewer have explored how trust might be recovered after it has been violated. Nevertheless, the existing literature in the area suggests that, in the initial stages of a relationship, trust may be granted as an individual operates under the assumption that trust is warranted as long as there is no evidence to the contrary (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998; Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer, 1996). Prior research has documented the tendency of people to initiate interactions with high levels of trust (McKnight et al., 1998; Myerson et al., 1996). Notably, higher pre-existing levels of trust mean that the responses of the injured party tend to be less intense or more limited in terms of the attributions made when a trust violation occurs (Benton, Gelber, Kelley, & Liebling, 1969; Robinson, 1996). However, it is also the case that a trust violation may lead an individual to become "unwilling to take risks and demand greater protection against betrayal" (Tyler & Kramer, 1996, p. 4), and it may cause trust to plunge to a level that may be below the initial trust level, representing a challenge to repair broken trust (Kim, Cooper, Ferrin, & Dirks, 2004). Slovic (1993) suggests that lost trust can take a long time to rebuild and that, in some cases, it may never be restored. Consequently, the process of repairing trust may be more challenging, requiring different strategies than that of initial trust development (Kim et al., 2004).

In the organizational psychology literature, competency and integrity represent two of the most important qualities for determining trustworthiness (Barber, 1983; Butler & Cantrell, 1984; Mayer et al., 1995; Schindler & Thomas, 1993). Not surprisingly, they are the two most commonly examined trust violations, with the two most commonly examined trust repair responses being apology and denial (Kim et al., 2004). Kim et al. (2004) examined differences in trust following apologies and denials for allegations of different types of trust violations,

including competence and integrity trust violations. They asked participants to assume the role of a manager in charge of a hiring decision and to judge the trustworthiness of a potential candidate. Participants watched video-taped interviews of a hypothetical candidate who was accused of filing an incorrect tax return in previous employment. The candidate either denied or apologized for the infraction that was portrayed as being an integrity or competency trust violation. It was found that trust was repaired more successfully when mistrusted parties apologized for violations concerning competence and denied responsibility for violations concerning integrity.

Kim et al. (2004) explained their results by suggesting that an apology is more effective than denial for a competence trust violation as individuals tend to weigh positive information regarding competence more heavily than negative information. The apology does indeed confirm that the violation was committed; however, the competence violation may be considered an anomaly that would not be repeated in the future. Admission of guilt from an apology may be less significant than its positive effect on trust, as the admission of guilt indicates that the violation would not happen again in the future, salvaging subsequent trust. In contrast, denial is more effective for an integrity violation as individuals tend to weigh negative information about integrity more heavily than positive information. Individuals may believe that those with high integrity will refrain from dishonest behavior, and those with low integrity may exhibit dishonest behavior. Consequently, denial limits perceived guilt, and repeating the infraction in the future is not an issue as it was denied in the first place. Apologizing for the integrity violation would be less effective than denying the violation, as the apology would confirm guilt and lack of integrity and would have a negative effect on subsequent trust, whereas denying the perceived integrity violation would salvage subsequent trust.

Advancing this research, Ferrin, Kim, Cooper and Dirks (2007) examined the effects of trust repair mechanisms, including apology, denial, and reticence (i.e., when an accused party does not confirm or disconfirm the veracity of an allegation) on competence- and integrity-based trust violations. Similar findings as those discussed earlier were observed, in that trust was repaired more successfully when mistrusted parties apologized for violations concerning competence but denied responsibility for violations concerning integrity. Reticence was also found to be a suboptimal response to integrity- and competence-based trust violations in terms of repairing trust.

Related research has examined cooperation, a component of trust (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002) in prisoners' dilemma and social dilemma games. In a study involving a repeated prisoners' dilemma game, Gibson, Bottom, and Murnighan (1999) examined methods to restore cooperation following uncooperative behavior. They found that apologies and offers of penance were effective in re-establishing cooperation. Indeed, prior work has demonstrated that when perpetrators apologize or show remorse, victims are less likely to retaliate (Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989; Schwartz, Kane, Joseph, & Tedeschi, 1978), more likely to perceive the perpetrators as being remorseful of violations, and more likely to be satisfied with an apology compared to no apology (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). In contrast, when denial was examined as an image restoration strategy employed by the fallen companies of Andersen and Enron due to corporate malfeasance, it was found to be ineffective as the public did not believe their innocence (George & Evuleocha, 2003).

Clearly, the empirical research on trust violation and restoration is limited, and has largely been conducted within the organizational psychology context. However, this research does

provide a foundation on which to explore trust restoration in the context of complex international military engagements.

3 Trust between Military Organizations and Indigenous Populations

Establishing and maintaining trust between military organizations and the local population they are assisting is considered to be integral to the success of international military operations. Research on interagency trust has indicated the importance of trust as key in alliance success (Jennings, Artz, Gillin, & Christodoulos, 2000). Trust has been termed "a critical factor in alliance formation and is believed to be particularly important for success in complex environments characterized by high ambiguity and uncertainty" (Branzei, Vertinsky, & Camp, 2007, p. 153), an environment typically found in international military engagements. In particular, within the context of an international military mission, trust facilitates cooperation as it enables the military to obtain necessary information from members of the local population regarding adversaries. Further, the trust of the local population enables the military to more effectively and efficiently provide support to the local population in rebuilding their community (van der Kloet, 2006). Similarly, timely information from the local population may stop terrorist activity and reinforce trust in the military mission (van der Kloet, 2006). Trust also fosters the military's ability to accomplish mission objectives, including the return of displaced persons back to their homes, restoration of the economy and community, and prevention of terrorism. If the indigenous population does not believe in the intentions of the military forces, or does not approve of their presence, then progress in development projects or interventions will be slow (Smith & Stohl, 2000). Indeed, recognizing the importance of gaining support from the indigenous population, American military officials have indicated that "winning the cooperation of Afghan civilians is the most effective weapon rather than shooting to victory" (Motevalli, 2010, p. 1).

This type of relationship or trust building requires communication and cultural awareness, and it also requires more than a military defeat of insurgents to build trust (The International Council on Security and Development, 2008; van der Kloet, 2006). The international community needs to listen to the indigenous population and build a relationship of mutual trust, "rather than saying we are here to help, and this is what you need" (Hampsey & McKenna, 2010). Indeed, "military operations are likely to be as much about gaining trust and legitimacy among the surrounding populations as engaging in armed combat and destroying adversaries" (Gizewski & Rostek, 2007, p. 3). The military should communicate to the local population that it is not an occupying party in the host nation with the sole purpose of removing adversaries, but that the military may also assist in improving living conditions and in teaching the local community how to continue rebuilding the nation when the military leaves. Further, not only should the military communicate its purpose concerning the host nation and state its intentions, but it should also deliver on promises, laying the foundation for building trust (van der Kloet, 2006).

Trust between military organizations and the local population they are assisting may be fostered in several ways, including delivering on promises and decreasing civilian casualties (The International Council on Security and Development, 2008). The importance of fulfilling promises in building trust with the local community has been demonstrated in the past, for instance, in Afghanistan. In that context, a prominent issue is the production of opium. In 2006, the governor of Kandahar called a meeting of 400 community leaders, the International

Security Assistance Force, and people from the national government in Kabul. The result of the meeting was the promise of modern machinery for improving the cultivation of the crop fields if farmers were to stop growing poppies, from which opium is derived. The promise of modern machinery was previously approved by ambassadors from the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and Canada, as well as by Afghan cabinet ministers. However, nothing came from this initiative due to failure of the foreign donors to deliver on their promises of assistance for the machinery (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). This failed initiative resulted in the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team experiencing a "loss of face" with Afghan local leaders (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). As a result, Afghans became skeptical of such promises, experiencing distrust of those who made promises (Olson & Gregorian, 2007). In addition, the failure to deliver on many promises of a better life made to the Afghan people has been cited as contributing to insurgents' ability to attract sympathy beyond their traditional support base and to gain political legitimacy among many Afghans (The International Council on Security and Development, 2008). The International Council on Security and Development (2008) clearly states that "the international community's failure to give sufficient focus to the needs and desires of the Afghan population and channel them into effective policy responses is a key aspect of the insurgency's rising popularity" (p. 15).

Furthermore, an increase in civilian casualties has proven to be detrimental to winning the support and trust of the Afghan people (The Senlis Council, 2007). Despite the good intentions and technical ability of military forces, the local population, who had once welcomed such forces with open arms, appears to be turning against them (The Senlis Council, 2007). This sentiment of protecting the local population was echoed by the head of the UK's armed forces, who indicated that being in Afghanistan is not about battling the Taliban, but about "protecting the local population and you don't protect them when you kill them" (BBC News, 2010). Indeed, protecting the indigenous population may be the only way to build Afghan trust (Green, 2010).

Recent media coverage also emphasizes the importance of gaining the trust and cooperation of the local population in order for militaries and international communities to attain their mission objectives. An interview with Canadian Defence Minister Peter MacKay and Brigadier General Jonathan Vance indicated that the cooperation of Afghan villages is essential to the ability of Canadians to deliver development programs, including the immunization of children and the building of schools (Tibbetts, 2009). The Defence Minister further stated that there is a "connection between our ability to deliver, and the security and the cooperation we require from local Afghans" (Tibbetts, 2009, p. 1), highlighting the importance of receiving trust and cooperation from the local population to the attainment of mission goals. In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Joe Paul, who served as commander of the Task Force Kandahar, also highlights that building trust involves the Canadian Forces (CF) providing jobs for the young people living in Afghanistan (The Canadian Press, 2009). The young people of Afghanistan tend to be swayed by the Taliban who give them $50 in exchange for setting an Improvised Explosive Device, which has the potential to shift support from the CF to the Taliban. Indeed, US Army General Stanley A. McChrystal, who was the former top US military commander in Afghanistan, asserts that "if the people are against us, we cannot be successful. If the people view us as occupiers and the enemy, we can't be successful and our casualties will go up dramatically" (Gilmore, 2009). General McChrystal noted that it was important for him to convey a message of trust and to demonstrate that he is not more valuable than the Afghan citizens (Gilmore, 2009). To

communicate this, General McChyrstal chose not to wear body armour or carry a sidearm when visiting Afghan governors and local Afghans, as the local citizens do not wear body armour attire or carry weaponry.

Past experience with building trust between military forces and a local population has indicated that the most successful strategy appears to be prioritizing the needs of the local population. In Southern Thailand, a local insurgency was ruling until the Thai military gradually won the trust and support of the local population after the military launched a soft power strategy (The Jakarta Post, 2010). This strategy consisted of the military being more engaged with how to improve the daily life of the locals rather than running combat activities. Of the 30,000 troops stationed in the south, nearly half were deployed among the locals to aid people in the development of agricultural skills and animal husbandry. They also provided free healthcare. A local member of the population stated that "people were afraid of the military in the past, but now we feel safe with them around. They teach us many valuable skills and improve our living conditions" (The Jakarta Post, 2010, p. 1)

Clearly, the population has increasingly become the centre of gravity in the complex environments that characterize contemporary missions. Building and maintaining trust between military organizations and the local population is essential for fostering cooperation from the local community. Furthermore, if that trust is violated, then the effective repair of the violated trust is necessary for successful military operations. While research on trust violation and trust repair in the context of military organizations assisting a local population is lacking, the present study examined the applicability of these findings from the organizational psychology literature to complex international military engagements.

4   Purpose of Study

The goal of this research was to gain insight into the nature of trust violations and trust repair mechanisms between military organizations, such as the CF, and the local population being assisted, and to determine which types of trust violations and trust repair responses are optimal for restoring trust in this context. Methodologically, this was a scenario-based study conducted with civilian members of Defence Research and Development (DRDC) Toronto, and local community members of Toronto, namely York University students. A previous pilot study revealed that the best trust-related outcomes occurred in the absence of trust violations (Gill, Febbraro, Thompson, 2009). However, when a trust violation did occur, the optimal response for repairing trust was an apology, rather than a denial, which is consistent with past literature examining the restoration of cooperation and image (George & Evuleocha, 2003; Gibson et al., 1999; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). The current study will explore the replicability of the pilot study findings using a larger sample of participants. Thus, this study aims to provide information on how to repair trust violations effectively between military organizations and the indigenous population being assisted.

5   Method

5.1   Participants

This study was conducted with 175[1] participants (76 male, 99 female, *M* age = 26.19, *SD* = 9.92). The majority of participants were White (*n* = 93, 53.1%), while the remainder of the sample was of Chinese (*n* = 22, 12.6%), South Asian (*n* = 19, 10.9%), Black (*n* = 17, 9.7%), Southeast Asian (*n* = 6, 3.4%), Arab (*n* = 5, 2.9%), Filipino (*n* = 3, 1.7%), Latin American (*n* = 3, 1.7%), West Asian (*n* = 3, 1.7%), Korean (*n* = 3, 1.7%), or Japanese (*n* = 1, 0.6%) descent. A large majority of participants were born in Canada (*n* = 116, 66.3%), while the remainder were born in China, the US, Guyana, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Serbia, Singapore, Korea, India, Ukraine, Russia, or Romania (1 to 4 participants were born in each of these countries). The mean number of years that participants had resided in Canada was 21.94 (*SD* = 11.83).

Participants included undergraduate students from York University and civilian participants from DRDC Toronto. Military participants were excluded as the focus of this study was to examine the perceptions of people who were taking the perspective of the local civilian population of an assisted country, rather than of a military population. Participants from York University were recruited through the Psychology Department's Undergraduate Research Participant Pool (URPP) and through a Call for Subjects poster that was posted on the York University campus (see Annex A). Participants from DRDC Toronto were recruited with the aid of an all-user's e-mail containing the same Call for Subjects poster as an attachment. The methodology and questionnaires were reviewed and approved by the DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) and all participants received remuneration according to DRDC guidelines.

5.2   Experimental Procedure

Methodologically, this is a scenario-based study. Participants were randomly assigned to each experimental condition (see Figure 1). Participants were run individually at DRDC Toronto and were seated in a room with a computer. The experiment was conducted on the computer, using MediaLab (Empirisoft, New York), which directed participants to the appropriate task. Only the researcher and participant had access to the room to ensure the privacy of participant responses. All participants were given an Information Letter describing the study (see Annex B). Participants were requested to complete all materials on the computer, excluding the Voluntary Consent Form, which was completed on paper (see Annex C, part C.1 for DRDC participants and Annex C, part C.2 for participants outside of DRDC). All remaining materials were read and completed on the computer, including the Biographical Data Form (see Annex D), the scenario (see Annex E, parts E.1, E.2, and E.3), the questionnaires (see Annex F), and the Debriefing Form

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[1] A power analysis indicated that a total of 175 participants has a 90% chance of detecting a medium sized effect of .25 (Cohen, 1988) when employing the .05 criterion of statistical significance (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).

(see Annex G). The experiment lasted approximately 1 hour. In order to protect the anonymity of participants the Voluntary Consent Forms were stored separately from the research data.

Participants were told that the study assessed perceptions of the relationship between military organizations and the local population being assisted, using a scenario in which the participants imagined themselves as a local citizen of a fictional country. The scenario consisted of a situation in which a fictional country, Safia, was experiencing conflict due to the rising power of a local terrorist organization. An initial scenario section provided a historical background to the fictional country of Safia, including a summary of the issues related to the current conflict within the country, as well as background into the government of Massey (another fictional country) which offered their military to assist Safia in dealing with the terrorist threat and re-building the country, specifically by providing improved health care and road/travel conditions, an educational system, and political infrastructure. Baseline measures assessing expectations concerning the Massey military, perceptions of their competence, benevolence and integrity, and trust intentions regarding the Massey military (see Figure 1 for design overview) were then completed. Following the Kim et al (2004) methodology, participants then read a second portion of the scenario that involved a competency-based trust violation, an integrity-based trust violation, or no trust violation (control). Participants were randomly assigned to a trust violation (competency vs. integrity), trust repair (denial vs. apology) or control condition (see Figure 2). The competence trust violation was constructed to indicate that the Massey military was unable to fulfil their mandate to provide basic resources and security to the local population due to their lack of knowledge/technical skills (see Butler & Cantrell, 1984), while the integrity trust violation was constructed to indicate that the Massey military failed to live up to their promises to provide security and resources because they appeared to be dishonest and self-serving (Mayer et al., 1995). In the control condition, no trust violation was committed. Participants next completed a second set of dependent measures identical to the first, with the addition of items assessing their willingness to risk their future to the Massey military.

The next portion of the scenario contained the trust repair manipulation based on the Massey military's response to criticisms of their activities. In the apology repair condition, the Massey military admitted that mistakes had been made, took responsibility for the errors to date, admitted their culpability to date and promised to correct the errors in the future. In the denial repair condition the Massey military largely denied any responsibility for not delivering on their mandate within Safia – indeed they suggested that the criticisms against them were largely political manoeuvring on the part of the Safian government. The control condition included no trust repair manipulation as no trust violation had been committed. A third set of dependent measures identical to the second questionnaire administered was then completed in order to assess trust levels after the repair manipulation. Finally, participants completed manipulation checks.

Figure 1: Trust Study Conditions

		Trust Violation		Control
		Competence	*Integrity*	*(i.e., No Trust Violation, No Repair Strategy)*
Trust Repair Strategy	Apology	n=35	n=35	n=35
	Denial	n=35	n=35	

Figure 2: Design Overview

Scenario Introduction	Baseline Measures	*Trust Violation Manipulation*	Post-Violation Measures	*Trust Repair Manipulation*	Post-Repair Measures	Post Scenario Measures
Country history, background to current conflict and request by Safian Government for Massey military assistance	a. Expectations of the Massey military b. Trust of Massey military: (perceived competence, integrity, benevolence) c. Trust intentions toward military	*Integrity* *vs.* *Competence* *vs.* *Control*	a. Expectations of the Massey military b. Trust of Massey military: (perceived competence, integrity, benevolence) c. Trust intentions toward Massey military d. Willingness to risk aspects of future on military	*Apology* *vs.* *Denial* *vs.* *Control*	a. Expectations of the Massey military b. Trust of Massey military: (perceived competence, integrity, benevolence) c. Trust intentions toward Massey military d. Willingness to risk aspects of future on military	a. Manipulation checks

Participants completed several questionnaires, including manipulation checks (Kim et al., 2004) (see Annex F), expectations of the military, willingness to risk their future on the military, trust beliefs, and trust intentions (Mayer & Davis, 1999) (see Annex F). Upon completion of the study, participants were given the Debriefing Form (see Annex G).

5.3 Measures[2]

Trust intentions. Four items assessed participants' propensity to trust the military (e.g., "I would let the Massey military continue to have influence over issues that are important to me for the duration of their mission here," adapted from Mayer & Davis, 1999). This measure, administered three times, had excellent reliabilities: baseline Cronbach's α=.87, post trust violation α=.96, and post repair α=.96.

Expectations of the military. Participants answered 7 items that assessed their expectations of the military organization assisting their country (e.g., "The Massey military and local Safians are likely to work well together," "The Massey military is likely to have good training"), that were adapted from a measure developed by Brown, Adams, Famewo, and Karthaus (2008). Reliability analyses for the measure were excellent: baseline Cronbach's α=.91, post trust violation α=.95, and post trust repair α=.95.

Willingness to risk. Seven items measured the degree to which participants agreed with statements such as: "If asked to be in a high-risk situation with the Massey military, I would be willing to rely on them to 'watch my back'/take care of me" (adapted from Brown et al., 2008). This measure was administered twice and yielded excellent reliabilities: post trust violation Cronbach's α=.96; post trust repair α=.98.

Trust dimensions. A total of 17 items adapted from Mayer and Davis (1999) reflected the three most prominent trust dimensions. Reliabilities were all excellent (competence, 6 items: e.g., "The Massey military are very capable of performing their job," baseline Cronbach's α=.94; post trust violation α=.94; post trust repair α=.93; benevolence, 5 items: e.g., "The Massey military are very concerned about the welfare of Safians," baseline α=.92; post trust violation α=.98; post trust repair α=.97; integrity, 6 items: e.g., "The Massey military has a strong sense of justice," baseline α=.92; post trust violation α=.96; post trust repair α=.95).

Manipulation checks. Participants answered three multiple-choice questions administered at the end of the study that assessed whether they recognized the nature of the violation (competence vs. integrity – 2 items) and the response to the violation (apology vs. denial – 1 item) (Kim et al., 2004).

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[2] Three other measures (i.e., empathy, ambivalence, and open-ended questions) were included in the questionnaire package; however, analyses of these measures were excluded as the focus of the study was to examine the quantitative measures on trust. The other measures will be examined in subsequent reports.

6   Results

6.1   Manipulation checks

Participants responded to three manipulation check questions that assessed whether or not they recognized the nature of the violation (competence vs. integrity) and the response to the violation (apology vs. denial). Cross-tabulation analyses presented in Table 1 indicated that, average percentages across the two questions ("In the scenario, the Massey military was accused of being unable to defeat the insurgency and improve conditions of Safia due to: _____" and "What does this accusation bring into question?") ranged from 81% in the integrity trust violation to 71% in the competency violation, and 94% in the control conditions. Results for the trust repair manipulation check question ("What was the Massey military's response to the accusation?") strongly confirmed this aspect of our manipulations, with the vast majority of participants correctly identifying the denial (80%) or apology (81%) trust repair manipulations, and 94% of participants in the control condition recognizing no trust repair aspects within the scenario they had read.

Supporting the strength of our trust violation manipulations overall, there was a significant decrease in trust from baseline to post trust violation in both the integrity and competence violation conditions (for perceived competence, perceived integrity, and perceived benevolence, as well as for trust intentions[3]; see Table 2), whereas there was a significant increase in trust from baseline to post trust violation for those who did not experience a trust violation (i.e., for those in the control condition). For participants who experienced the competence trust violation, significant declines in trust were observed for perceived competence ($t(69) = 18.99$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .84$), perceived benevolence ($t(69) = 14.25$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .74$), perceived integrity ($t(69) = 14.34$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .74$), and trust intentions ($t(69) = 13.40$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .72$). For the integrity trust violation, significant decreases were observed for perceived competence ($t(69) = 7.59$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .45$), perceived benevolence ($t(69) = 13.92$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .73$), perceived integrity ($t(69) = 13.99$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .74$), and trust intentions ($t(69) = 12.83$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .70$). For participants who did not experience a trust violation (control condition), significant increases in trust were observed for perceived competence ($t(34) = -8.91$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .70$), perceived benevolence ($t(34) = -7.96$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .65$), perceived integrity ($t(34) = -8.69$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .68$), and trust intentions ($t(34) = -8.54$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .68$).

Overall, and consistent with our expectations and previous findings from an earlier pilot study (Gill et al., 2009), initial trust (baseline trust) was higher than trust assessed post violation for both the competence and integrity trust violation manipulations, indicating that allegations of untrustworthy behavior were sufficient to violate initial trust. Indeed, decreases in trust were observed across all trust measures, including the three trust dimensions and trust intentions, regardless of the trust violation condition. For instance, in the competence trust violation condition, a decrease in trust was observed not only for the competence trust dimension, but also for the integrity and benevolence trust dimensions. Likewise, for the integrity trust violation condition, a decrease in trust was observed not only for the integrity trust dimension, but also for the competence and benevolence trust dimensions.

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[3] To minimize Type I errors, the Bonferroni adjustment was applied to all analyses to maintain a family-wise error rate of .05 (Weinberg & Abramowitz, 2002).

Table 1: Cross-tabulation results of trust violation and trust repair manipulation checks.

	Percentage Correctly Identified
Manipulation Checks	
Trust Violation Check #1[1]	
Competence trust violation condition	75%
Integrity trust violation condition	80%
Control condition	97%
Trust Violation Check #2[2]	
Competence trust violation condition	66%
Integrity trust violation condition	81%
Control condition	91%
Trust Repair Check[3]	
Apology repair condition	81%
Denial repair condition	80%
Control condition	94%

[1] Participants were asked: "In the scenario, the Massey military was accused of being unable to defeat the insurgency and improve conditions of Safia due to?" _____
[2] Participants were asked: "What does this accusation bring into question?"
[3] Participants were asked: "What was the Massey military's response to the accusation?"

Table 2: Means and standard deviations (SDs) of trust dimensions (perceived competence, integrity, benevolence) and trust intentions by trust violations.

	Trust Violations					
	Competence		Integrity		Control	
	Mean	(SD)	Mean	(SD)	Mean	(SD)
Perceived Competence						
Baseline	5.41[a]	(0.94)	4.90[a]	(1.35)	4.75[a]	(1.23)
Post violation	2.30[b]	(1.00)	3.44[b]	(1.39)	6.11[b]	(0.96)
Perceived Benevolence						
Baseline	4.78[a]	(1.10)	4.21[a]	(1.37)	4.18[a]	(1.39)
Post violation	2.39[b]	(1.23)	1.70[b]	(0.90)	5.79[b]	(0.92)
Perceived Integrity						
Baseline	4.82[a]	(0.99)	4.46[a]	(1.39)	4.44[a]	(1.29)
Post violation	2.43[b]	(1.09)	1.89[b]	(0.79)	5.88[b]	(0.84)
Trust Intentions						
Baseline	4.19[a]	(1.31)	3.89[a]	(1.44)	4.10[a]	(1.26)
Post violation	1.86[b]	(0.95)	1.60[b]	(0.77)	5.52[b]	(1.22)

Note: Superscripts denote significant differences in a given column at $p < .05$.

6.2 Effects of trust violations and trust repair strategies on intentions to trust, future willingness to risk, expectations of future assistance, and trust dimensions.

To examine the effects of trust violations and trust repair strategies on the trust measures, we conducted six separate univariate 2 (trust violation: competency vs. integrity) x 2 (trust repair: apology vs. denial) Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) on the dependent variables of trust intentions, willingness to risk, expectations concerning the Massey military, and trust dimensions of competence, benevolence, and integrity, respectively[4]. As anticipated, given the results of the manipulation checks, participants who had not experienced a trust violation (control condition) reported a significantly greater propensity to trust the military (trust intentions) than those who had experienced the apology or denial trust repair, $F(1,170) = 5.62$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .032$ (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations). In addition, participants who had experienced the apology trust repair strategy had a greater propensity to trust the military compared to those who had experienced the denial trust repair strategy (see Table 3).

Table 3: Means and standard deviations (SDs) of trust intentions by trust violations and trust repair strategies.

	Trust Violation	
	Competence	Integrity
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Trust Repair		
Apology	$2.21^{a,b}$ (0.86)	$2.31^{a,b}$ (1.47)
Denial	$2.09^{a,c}$ (1.18)	$1.57^{a,c}$ (0.95)
Control	5.45^{b} (1.11)	5.45^{b} (1.11)

Note: Different superscripts denote significant differences in a given column at $p < .05$.

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[4] To minimize Type I errors, the Bonferroni adjustment was applied to all analyses to maintain a family-wise error rate of .05 (Weinberg & Abramowitz, 2002).

Moreover, participants who did not experience a trust violation (control condition) were more willing to risk (i.e., put their own life on the line), and were more likely to endorse a belief that the military will "watch their back," than were those who experienced an apology or denial trust repair strategy, $F(1,170) = 6.05$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .034$. Follow-up comparisons also revealed that those who experienced an apology were significantly more willing to risk compared to those who experienced a denial trust repair strategy (see Table 4 for means and standard deviations).

Table 4: Means and standard deviations (SDs) of willingness to risk by trust violations and trust repair strategies.

| | Trust Violation | |
| | Competence | Integrity |
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Trust Repair		
Apology	2.69[a,b] (1.09)	2.69[a,b] (1.34)
Denial	2.43[a,c] (1.39)	1.96[a,c] (1.17)
Control	5.73[b] (0.95)	5.73[b] (0.95)

Note: Superscripts denote significant differences in a given column at $p < .05$.

Consistent with results for trust intentions and willingness to risk, participants who did not experience the trust violation (control condition) reported significantly more positive/higher expectations of the military assisting their country than did those who experienced an apology or denial trust repair strategy, $F(1,170) = 10.25$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .057$ (see Table 5 for means and standard deviations). Still, those individuals who experienced an apology had significantly more positive expectations of the military assisting their country compared to those who experienced the denial trust repair strategy (see Table 5).

Table 5: Means and standard deviations (SDs) of expectations by trust violations and trust repair strategies.

	Trust Violation	
	Competence	Integrity
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Trust Repair		
Apology	2.60[a,b] (1.10)	3.10[a,b] (1.11)
Denial	2.31[a,c] (1.08)	2.27[a,c] (1.11)
Control	6.07[b] (0.71)	6.07[b] (0.71)

Note: Superscripts denote significant differences in a given column at $p < .05$.

A significant main effect was found for the trust repair condition, $F(1,170) = 9.25$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .052$, for the trust dimensions of perceived competence, perceived benevolence, and perceived integrity. Follow-up comparisons indicated that participants who had not experienced a trust violation perceived the military to possess greater competence, benevolence, and integrity compared to those who had experienced the apology or denial trust repair strategy. However, it was also the case that those who experienced the apology trust repair strategy perceived the military to possess greater competence, benevolence, and integrity compared to those who experienced the denial trust repair strategy (see Table 6 for means and standard deviations).

Table 6: Means and standard deviations (SDs) of trust dimensions (perceived competence, perceived integrity, perceived benevolence) by trust violations and trust repair strategies.

	Trust Violation		
	Competence	Integrity	Control[+]
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)
Trust Repair			
Apology			
Perceived competence	2.85[a,b] (0.93)	3.70[a,b] (1.47)	6.01[b] (0.79)
Perceived integrity	2.86[a,b] (0.98)	2.55[a,b] (1.25)	5.78[b] (0.95)
Perceived benevolence	2.99[a,b] (1.14)	2.39[a,b] (1.35)	5.72[b] (0.90)
Denial			
Perceived Competence	2.46[a,c] (1.11)	2.87[a,c] (1.41)	6.01[b] (0.79)
Perceived Integrity	2.52[a,c] (1.19)	2.68[a,c] (0.98)	5.78[b] (0.95)
Perceived Benevolence	2.48[a,c] (1.31)	1.88[a,c] (0.95)	5.72[b] (0.90)
Control[+]			
Perceived Competence	6.01[b] (0.79)	6.01[b] (0.79)	
Perceived Integrity	5.78[b] (0.95)	5.78[b] (0.95)	
Perceived Benevolence	5.72[b] (0.90)	5.72[b] (0.90)	

[+] This group acted as a control in which participants do not experience the trust violation or trust repair manipulations.

Note: Superscripts denote significant differences in a given column at $p < .05$ (e.g., those who did not experience a trust violation, the control condition, perceived the military to possess greater competence, benevolence, and integrity compared to those who had experienced the apology or denial trust repair strategy. Also, those who experienced the apology trust repair strategy perceived the military to possess greater competence, benevolence, and integrity compared to those who experienced the denial trust repair strategy.

7   Discussion

7.1   Manipulation checks

Based on the results of the manipulation checks for trust violation and trust repair strategies, the manipulations were successful with over 76% of participants correctly identifying the type of trust violation, and over 80% of participants correctly identifying the type of trust repair strategy. In terms of assessing participants' initial baseline level of trust and whether or not allegations of untrustworthy behavior were sufficient to violate that trust, results indicated that, consistent with expectations and past research (Ferrin et al., 2007; Gill et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2004), initial (baseline) trust was significantly higher than trust assessed post violation for the competence and integrity trust violation conditions, indicating that allegations of untrustworthy behavior were indeed sufficient to violate initial trust. However, it is also worth noting that decreases in trust were observed not only for the specific trust dimension involved, but also for other trust dimensions. This suggests that violations of trust based on one trust dimension (competence or integrity) may generalize to other trust dimensions as well.

7.2   Effects of trust violations and trust repair strategies on intentions to trust, future willingness to risk, expectations of future assistance, and trust dimensions.

Overall, the results are largely consistent with the previous literature (Ferrin et al., 2007; George & Evuleocha, 2003; Gibson et al., 1999; Ohbuchi et al., 1989; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008; Schwartz et al., 1978), as well as our earlier work in this area (Gill et al., 2009). For instance, trust impairment followed trust violations. Indeed, decreases in trust after the trust violation manipulation occurred were observed across all trust measures, including the three trust dimensions (perceived competence, integrity, and benevolence) and trust intentions, regardless of the trust violation condition. For instance, in the competence trust violation condition, a decrease in trust was observed not only for the competence trust dimension, but also for the integrity and benevolence trust dimensions. Likewise, for the integrity trust violation condition, a decrease in trust was observed not only for the integrity trust dimension, but also for the competence and benevolence trust dimensions. Further, our results showed that some recovery of trust occurred, at least to a limited extent following the apology trust repair strategy.

Results also demonstrated that the best trust-related outcomes occur in the absence of trust violations. However, in contrast to previous research (e.g., Kim et al., 2004), where trust violations did occur, it appears that the most effective trust repair strategy is an apology rather than a denial, regardless of condition, although it is important to note that the means for trust measures following either repair strategy remained low in comparison to no trust violation (the control condition). Notably, while Kim and colleagues found a significant interaction between the trust violation and trust repair manipulations (e.g., apology more effective for competence

violation, denial more effective for integrity violation), we found a significant main effect for the trust repair manipulation (e.g., apology more effective than denial regardless of type of trust violation). This difference in findings regarding trust repair may reflect the different contexts of these two studies; our study examined trust violations and trust repair within the context of a fictional local population from a war torn country, whereas Kim and colleagues examined these trust issues specifically within an organizational setting (i.e., a hiring decision). Although both studies were conducted in a laboratory setting, the differences in content between these two contexts (international military engagements vs. hiring decisions) may nevertheless involve very different challenges in terms of the magnitude and implications of the trust violations, with potentially varying repercussions for restoring trust.

Although some differences between our results and the results of Kim et al. (2004) were found, it is important to highlight that our findings are consistent with past research examining the effectiveness of apologies in restoring cooperation and image (George & Evuleocha, 2003; Gibson et al., 1999; Ohbuchi et al., 1989; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008; Schwartz et al., 1978), as well as previous research on improving trust after a trust violation has occurred (Gill et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2004). Anecdotal evidence suggests that an apology may be more effective than denial when used outside of the research context and within the "real world." For instance, when the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) apologized to the mother of a man who they had unintentionally killed by taser, the mother said that "the apologies given by the authorities will help begin the healing process" (CBC, 2010). Similarly, within the context of international military engagements, apologies have been given by the former top US military commander, General Stanley McChrystal, to the local Afghan population in an attempt to make amends for civilian casualties (The Ottawa Citizen, 2010). While the effect of the apology on the local Afghan population is not yet known, such evidence suggests that the apology may initiate the healing process and may be a first step to improving trust.

The present study is one of the first to employ a scenario-based experimental approach to explore trust within the context of international military missions. While valuable, the current study does have limitations. The scenario-based design suggests that the trust-related elements examined here may not be comparable to the real-life experience of negotiating trust while actually living in a war-torn country. The latter involves intense and chronic stress and grave consequences, as well as a lack of resources to survive. Although we asked participants to imagine themselves as members of a local population and react accordingly, the actual negative consequences of experiencing the trust violations and trust repair strategies were of course minimal and did not extend beyond the laboratory.

Nevertheless, a distinct advantage of studying trust in the current context is the direct manipulation of trust variables in the context of the control provided within laboratory conditions. In actual field settings, response to trust violations are likely to be influenced by factors such as the organizational or cultural context, the quality of existing relationships, and the reputations of individuals involved. Undoubtedly these factors are important, but if we were to examine trust violation and repair in a field setting, there would be the risk that the field setting would introduce uncontrolled factors that may influence the relationship between trust violation and repair. Consequently, given the early stages of this research, it is advantageous to examine trust violation and repair in a controlled setting where these factors can be examined in isolation.

Additional research needs to be conducted to further explore the effectiveness of an apology in repairing trust given the preliminary nature of this research. In addition, examining trust restoration with military participants would provide insight into trust restoration strategies from their perspective, allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of trust restoration from not only the local population but also the military point of view. Military participants would provide a different perspective that would include their experiences and beliefs as military members and these may be significantly different from those of a member of the local population, or civilian participants. In addition, future research should also examine trust violation and repair in the context of a more culturally diverse sample. Although our sample had a varied cultural background, the vast majority of participants had lived in Canada all or most of their lives. Thus, it would be important to repeat the study with a sample that was more truly culturally diverse, given the cultural diversity in countries to which Canada deploys.

In summary then, the results of this research indicate that the best situation is the absence of trust violations; however, when trust violations do occur, the optimal response appears to be an apology. This finding is supported by past research (George & Evuleocha, 2003; Gisbon et al., 1999; Gill et al., 2009; Ohbuchi et al., 1989; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008; Schwartz et al., 1978). Further, while anecdotal evidence suggests that an apology may assist in initiating the healing process of an injured party (CBC, 2010), the potential role of an apology in repairing trust with a local population remains unexamined in a real-world setting, and warrants further research.

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Annex A   Call for Participants Poster/Email

Title of Experiment: Understanding the relationship between military organizations and a local population

Purpose of Experiment: To increase understanding of the current relationship between military organizations and the local population they are assisting.

Procedure:
You will be asked to read a scenario and complete self-report questionnaires assessing your perceptions of the scenario. All tasks will be completed on a computer.

Types of Participants Requested:
We are recruiting civilian female and male participants. Participants must be 18 years of age or older. Only civilian participants are included as the focus of this study is to examine the local civilian population of an assisted country, rather than a military population.

Location of Experiments:
DRDC Toronto

Invasive Procedures and Non-Invasive Measures Required:
No invasive or non-invasive measures will be required for this study.

Duration of Participant Participation:
The experiment will last 1 hour.

Risks to Participant:
This is an acceptable risk study. The anticipated physical, social, psychological, emotional, or other risks associated with this experiment are minimal (e.g., minor eye strain).

Benefits:
The potential benefits of this pilot study include gaining insight into one's perceptions of the relationship between a military organization and the local population they are assisting, as well as insight into the nature of complex security environments.

Compensation:
Stress remuneration will be provided according to Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) guidelines.

Point of Contact:
Dr. Ritu Gill, Defence Scientist (Ritu.Gill@drdc-rddc.gc.ca or 416-635-3002)
Dr. Angela Febbraro, Defence Scientist, (Angela.Febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca or 416-635-3120)
Dr. Megan Thompson, Defence Scientist (Megan.Thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca or 416-635-2040)

Annex B   Information Letter

Dear Participant:

You are being asked to participate in a study exploring perceptions of the relationship between military organizations and the local population they are assisting. The purpose of this study, entitled, "Understanding the relationship between military organizations and a local population" is to increase our understanding of the current relationship between military organizations and the local population being assisted.

As you may be aware, the need to better understand the relationship between military organizations and the local population being assisted has become apparent over the years. Local populations receiving support from non-local military organizations have initially responded positively to such assistance; however, over time, the relationship has at times been noted to change. The purpose of the present study is to examine how the relationship between these two groups may shift and what mechanisms are optimal to address such changes. Ultimately the goal of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between military organizations and the local population being assisted.

To assist in this study, you are being asked for approximately 1 hour of your time. You will be asked a number of biographical questions. You will also be asked to imagine that you are a member of the local population of a war-torn country and will be presented with a written description of recent conditions in the country. At different points in the scenario you will be asked to respond to questions that assess a variety of your perceptions *as a member of the local population*. The study will be conducted in a laboratory room on a computer at Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) – Toronto. Only you and the researcher will have access to the room to ensure the privacy of your responses.

We recognize that participating in this study takes up your time. Although we cannot pay you for your time, we are able to give you a small remuneration as authorized by the Department of National Defence.

The information that you provide in the study is strictly confidential. With your consent, all data will be kept in a secure location accessible only to the researchers involved with this or ensuing projects. The same consideration will apply should you grant permission for the secondary use of data, and at no time will the content of your responses be made available to anyone outside of the subsequent research team(s). Your informed consent will be kept separately from your data, which will be identified via an anonymous subject code.

The risks associated with your participation in this study are minimal (e.g., minor eye strain), and are anticipated to be no greater than what you would encounter in your daily life or occupation. If, however, the topic/questions make you feel uncomfortable, you should feel free to decline to answer. Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from the study at any time, without penalty. If you withdraw from the study your data will be destroyed, or however you wish to handle the data in this case.

If you are interested in participating in this study, please complete the attached Voluntary Consent Form. The Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) of Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) has approved this study (L-701B).

If you have any questions please feel free to contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Ritu Gill.

Sincerely,

Dr. Ritu M. Gill
DRDC Toronto
1133 Sheppard Avenue West
P.O. Box 2000
Toronto, Ontario
M3M 3B9
Tel: (416) 635-2000, Ext. 3002
Fax: (416) 635-2191
E-mail:
Ritu.Gill@drdc-rddc.gc.ca

Annex C

C.1   Voluntary Consent Form (DRDC Participants Only)

Protocol Number: L-701B
Title: Understanding the Relationship between Military Organizations and a Local Population
Principal Investigator: Dr. Ritu M. Gill, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto
Co-Investigators: Dr. Angela R. Febbraro, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto; Dr. Megan Thompson, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto; Ms. Marissa Barnes, York University
Thrust: 12og, JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander (Applied Research Project in Land Command Thrust, PG2)

I _____ (name) of _____ (address and phone number) hereby volunteer to participate as a participant in the study "Understanding the relationship between military organizations and a local population" (Protocol L-701B). I have read the Information Letter, and have had the opportunity to ask questions of the Principal Investigator. All of my questions concerning this study have been fully answered to my satisfaction. However, I may obtain additional information about the research project and have any questions about this study answered by contacting Dr. Ritu M. Gill at 416-635-2000 Extension 3002, or Dr. Jack Landolt at 416-635-2000 Extension 2120.

I have been told that I will be asked to participate in a study lasting approximately 1 hour. I understand that I will be asked to imagine that I am a member of the local population of a war-torn country and will be presented with a written description of recent conditions in the country. At different points in the scenario I will be asked to respond to questions that assess a variety of my perceptions *as a member of the local population.* I will also be asked to complete a short Biographical Data Form.

I have been told that the risks associated with this research are acceptable (e.g., minor eye strain). However, if asked questions that make me feel uncomfortable, I may decline to answer and I may terminate my participation at any time without penalty. Also, I acknowledge that my participation in this study, or indeed in any research, may involve risks that are currently unforeseen by DRDC Toronto.

I have been advised that all data I provide will be treated as strictly confidential, and will not be revealed to anyone other than the DRDC Toronto Investigators without my consent, except as data unidentified as to source. I also understand that the data concerning me may be used in future research projects by researchers in collaboration with the Investigators.

I understand that I am free to refuse to participate and may withdraw my consent without prejudice or penalty at any time. Should I withdraw my consent, my participation as a participant will cease immediately. In this case I will have the option of requiring that any data that I have provided be destroyed. I also understand that the Investigator(s), or their designate, may terminate my participation at any time, regardless of my wishes.

I understand that for my participation in this research project, I am entitled to a remuneration in the form of a stress allowance in the amount of $32.56.

Please note that stress remuneration is taxable. T4A slips are issued only for amounts in excess of $500.00 paid during a year.

Also, I understand that my name will not be identified or attached in any manner to any publication arising from this study. Moreover, should it be required, I agree to allow the experimental data to be reviewed by an internal or external audit committee with the understanding that any summary information resulting from such a review will not identify me personally.

I also understand that by signing this consent form I have not waived any legal rights I may have as a result of any harm to me occasioned by my participation in this research project beyond the risks I have assumed.

Section Head: _____(DRDC civilian participants only)
Participant's name: _____
Signature:_____
Date: _____

SECONDARY USE OF DATA:

I consent/do not consent (circle as appropriate) to the use of this study's experimental data involving me in unidentified form in future related studies provided that review and approval have been given by DRDC HREC.

PARTICIPATION IN OTHER RESEARCH PROJECTS:

I have informed the Principal Investigator that I am currently a participant in the following other research project(s): _____ , and that I am participating as a participant in the following research project(s) at institutions other than DRDC: _____.

FOR SUBJECT ENQUIRY IF REQUIRED:

Should I have any questions or concerns regarding this project before, during or after participation, I understand that I am encouraged to contact Defence Research and Development Canada -Toronto (DRDC Toronto), P.O. Box 2000, 1133 Sheppard Avenue West, Toronto, Ontario, M3M 3B9. This contact can be made by surface mail at this address or in person, by phone or e-mail to any of the DRDC Toronto members and addresses listed below:

- Principal Investigator: Dr. Ritu M. Gill, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 3002, ritu.gill@drdc-rddc.gc.ca
- Co-Investigator and Project Manager: Dr. Angela Febbraro, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 3120, angela.febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca
- Co-Investigator: Dr. Megan Thompson, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 2040, megan.thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca
- Chair, DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee (HERC): Dr. Jack Landolt, 416-635-2120, jack.landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca

I understand that I will be given a copy of this consent form so that I may contact any of the above-mentioned individuals at some time in the future should that be required.

C.2   Voluntary Consent Form (Participants outside of DRDC)

Protocol Number: L-701B
Title: Understanding the Relationship between Military Organizations and a Local Population
**Principal Investigator:** Dr. Ritu M. Gill, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto
Co-Investigators: Dr. Angela R. Febbraro, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto; Dr. Megan Thompson, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto; Ms. Marissa Barnes, York University
Thrust: 12og, JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander (Applied Research Project in Land Command Thrust, PG2)

I _____ (name) of _____ (address and phone number) hereby volunteer to participate as a participant in the study "Understanding the Relationship between Military Organizations and a Local Population" (Protocol L-701B). I have read the Information Letter, and have had the opportunity to ask questions of the Principal Investigator. All of my questions concerning this study have been fully answered to my satisfaction. However, I may obtain additional information about the research project and have any questions about this study answered by contacting Dr. Ritu M. Gill at 416-635-2000 Extension 3002, or Dr. Jack Landolt at 416-635-2000 Extension 2120.

I have been told that I will be asked to participate in a study lasting approximately 1 hour. I understand that I will be asked to imagine that I am a member of the local population of a war-torn country and will be presented with a written description of recent conditions in the country. At different points in the scenario I will be asked to respond to questions that assess a variety of my perceptions *as a member of the local population.* I will also be asked to complete a short Biographical Data Form.

I have been told that the risks associated with this research are acceptable (e.g., minor eye strain). However, if asked questions that make me feel uncomfortable, I may decline to answer and I may terminate my participation at any time without penalty. Also, I acknowledge that my participation in this study, or indeed in any research, may involve risks that are currently unforeseen by DRDC Toronto.

I have been advised that all data I provide will be treated as strictly confidential, and will not be revealed to anyone other than the DRDC Toronto Investigators without my consent, except as data unidentified as to source. I also understand that the data concerning me may be used in future research projects by researchers in collaboration with the Investigators.

I understand that I am free to refuse to participate and may withdraw my consent without prejudice or penalty at any time. Should I withdraw my consent, my participation as a participant will cease immediately. In this case I will have the option of requiring that any data that I have provided be destroyed. I also understand that the Investigator(s), or their designate, may terminate my participation at any time, regardless of my wishes.

I understand that for my participation in this research project, I am entitled to a remuneration in the form of a stress allowance in the amount of $30.40.

Please note that stress remuneration is taxable. T4A slips are issued only for amounts in excess of $500.00 paid during a year.

Also, I understand that my name will not be identified or attached in any manner to any publication arising from this study. Moreover, should it be required, I agree to allow the experimental data to be reviewed by an internal or external audit committee with the understanding that any summary information resulting from such a review will not identify me personally.

I also understand that by signing this consent form I have not waived any legal rights I may have as a result of any harm to me occasioned by my participation in this research project beyond the risks I have assumed.

Participant's name: _____

Signature:_____

Date: _____

Principal Investigator: _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____

SECONDARY USE OF DATA:

I consent/do not consent (circle as appropriate) to the use of this study's experimental data involving me in unidentified form in future related studies provided that review and approval have been given by DRDC HREC.

PARTICIPATION IN OTHER RESEARCH PROJECTS:

I have informed the Principal Investigator that I am currently a participant in the following other research project(s): _____ , and that I am participating as a participant in the following research project(s) at institutions other than DRDC: _____.

FOR SUBJECT ENQUIRY IF REQUIRED:

Should I have any questions or concerns regarding this project before, during or after participation, I understand that I am encouraged to contact Defence Research and Development Canada -Toronto (DRDC Toronto), P.O. Box 2000, 1133 Sheppard Avenue West, Toronto, Ontario, M3M 3B9. This contact can be made by surface mail at this address or in person, by phone or e-mail to any of the DRDC Toronto members and addresses listed below:

- Principal Investigator: Ritu M. Gill, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 3002, ritu.gill@drdc-rddc.gc.ca
- Co-Investigator and Project Manager: Dr. Angela R. Febbraro, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 3120, angela.febbraro@drdc-rddc.gc.ca

- Co-Investigator: Dr. Megan Thompson, DRDC Toronto, 416-635-2000, Extension 2040, megan.thompson@drdc-rddc.gc.ca
- Chair, DRDC Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC): Dr. Jack Landolt, 416-635-2120, jack.landolt@drdc-rddc.gc.ca

I understand that I will be given a copy of this consent form so that I may contact any of the above-mentioned individuals at some time in the future should that be required.

Annex D   Biographical Data Form

1. Age _____

2. Gender (please check the appropriate box):

   □ Male
   □ Female

3. Marital Status: (please check the appropriate box):

   □ Single
   □ Married
   □ Divorced
   □ Separated
   □ Widowed
   □ Common-Law

4. Highest Level of Education (please check the appropriate box):

   □ Some High School
   □ Completed High School
   □ Some College
   □ Completed College
   □ Some Trade School
   □ Completed Trade School
   □ Some University
   □ Completed Undergraduate Degree
   □ University Professional Degree
   □ Some Graduate Courses
   □ Master's Degree
   □ Doctorate

5. Ethnic Background (please check the appropriate box):

   □ White
   □ Chinese
   □ South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, etc.)
   □ Black
   □ Filipino
   □ Latin American
   □ Southeast Asian (e.g., Cambodian, Indonesian, Vietnamese, etc.)
   □ Arab
   □ West Asian (e.g., Afghan, Iranian, etc.)
   □ Japanese
   □ Korean

      □ Aboriginal
      □ Other – please specify _____

6. Country of Birth: _____

7. Country of Citizenship: _____

8. If applicable, which countries did you reside in before coming to Canada:
_____

9. Number of years residing in Canada: _____

10. First language:

      □ English
      □ French
      □ Other (please specify)   _____

Annex E

E.1   Competence Violation Scenario

Please read the following scenario, and **imagine yourself in the following situation as a native of the country Safia**, where you and your family are from and are residing.

Background of Safia:

Your country, Safia, has been ravaged for the past two decades by wars, massive poverty, and horrendous crimes against humanity. The life expectancy of your people is 44 years; 53% of the total population lives below the poverty line; the adult literacy rate is 29%; only 3% of women are literate and in some areas less than 1% of the population is literate; one woman dies from pregnancy-related causes every 30 minutes; and one out of five children dies before the age of 5. The average monthly wage in your country is the equivalent of CDN$50, the average monthly rent is CDN$250, and the average monthly food/expenses cost is CDN$250. The scale of poverty in your land has led to massive corruption.

Agriculture is the main occupation, although less than 10% of the land is cultivated; a large percentage of the arable land was damaged by warfare during the 1980s and 1990s. Crops include wheat and other grains, fruits, and nuts. One of Safia's main crops is the cocoa leaf, which has both medicinal and nutritional value. Road conditions throughout Safia are poor; pack animals are an important means of transport within the country.

A few years ago a local terrorist group started to take over your country declaring itself the legitimate government of Safia. The local terrorist group controlled 90% of your country by 2000, but its government was not generally recognized by the international community. In order to deal with the terrorist threat, to assist in rebuilding the nation, and to provide a better quality of life for you and local Safians, the Safian government has asked for assistance from the international community.

The country of Massey responded to that request and several thousand military troops from Massey were deployed to Safia. The Massey military has responded to the Safian government's request not only because Massey is a member state of the United Nations (UN) but also because the volunteer forces of the Massey military have a history of assisting other countries in times of need. The Massey government and military set the following goals for their mission in Safia: the rebuilding and reconstruction of roads, infrastructure and agriculture, and the liberation of the country from the growing domestic terrorist organization. From this public announcement of their goals, you and many of the locals from Safia are expecting significant improvements in security and living conditions in Safia that will be delivered by the Massey military.

PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONNAIRES.

Complete Questionnaires. *(Baseline/Pre-Violation Measures)*

PLEASE CONTINUE READING SCENARIO ON NEXT PAGE.

The Situation in Safia since the arrival of the Massey Military:

After 4 years, little progress seems to have been made in the areas of reconstruction, development and security. Recently, the UN Development Programme has stated that, "reconstruction and development is urgently needed otherwise this fragile nation could easily slip back into chaos and abject poverty."

Very little of the Massey military efforts appear to have been directed toward vital development and reconstruction projects. First, out of 21,000 kilometers of roads, only 2,793 kilometers are paved. There are 47 airports, but only 10 have paved runways, and only 3 of them are over 3,047 meters. Although originally taking responsibility to pave the roads in Safia, the Massey military says it simply does not have enough equipment or experienced engineers available to pave any more of the roadways.

Second, the Massey military does not allow the workers of the UN and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to travel on the Safian national airline, claiming the Safian national airline to be unsafe, although it can provide no evidence to support this claim. Instead the Massey military recommends the use of non-Safian private airline companies to provide services for foreign workers under the "provision of services for humanitarian, relief and development projects and organizations." This represents a significant amount of revenue as the fares for trips on these non-Safian airlines range from $73 to $1900 (CDN). The Massey military's endorsement of non-Safian airlines versus the local Safian airline takes a significant source of funds away from local Safians and places these badly needed resources into the hands of the non-Safian airline companies. This decision represents the lack of skills and knowledge on the part of the Massey military in terms of understanding what is needed for effective reconstruction in Safia. You and other Safians see this is as another example of the incompetence of the Massey military.

Third, the local Safians who live in urban areas have electricity for only a few hours per day, mainly in the evenings. However, the 40 international organizations (e.g., the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the UN, operating in Safia, are supplied modern equipment, electricity, water and gas by the Massey military. Local Safians are resentful of the fact that after 4 years they do not have consistent access to electricity, gas and clean water, while foreigners enjoy these facilities. The Massey military states that its lack of technical knowledge concerning the older water and electricity systems in Safia makes it unable to extend these services to the local population.

Fourth, the military protection efforts of the Massey military appear to be largely directed toward protecting the international organizations operating in Safia, rather than protecting the local Safian population. In fact, over the last 4 years there have been several credible reports that Massey military operations have led to local Safian civilian fatalities and in some instances have destroyed infrastructure needed for effective aid and development. In response to these accusations, the Massey military has stated that targeting errors have occurred due to the Massey military's lack of experience with new equipment that is malfunctioning in the climate of Safia.

Fifth, as indicated earlier, Safians use the cocoa leaf to produce tea leaves and sell the leaves for profit, providing them with a source of income. However, the cocoa leaf has also been used by terrorists to make illegal drugs (i.e., cocaine), which provides a source of funding for their insurgency. In response, the Massey military has implemented a policy of forced cocoa leaf eradication. This policy not only removes a source of funding for the terrorists, but also has a negative effect on Safians by destroying the local Safians' source of income without providing them with an alternative livelihood. A year ago the Massey military announced a plan that would monitor and allow a legitimate method for Safian farmers to grow cocoa leaves for tea production while simultaneously eradicating illegal sales of cocoa leaves for cocaine production. A year later it seems that this plan was unsuccessful because the Massey military lacked the coordination and communication skills to successfully implement the plan. Consequently, due to the Massey military's lack of technical skills and knowledge in monitoring the illegal sales of cocoa leaves, the local Safians have lost a viable source of income.

Overall, the inconsistently implemented efforts by the Massey military for development and reconstruction appear to be underfunded and to have failed to achieve any significant impact on Safians' living conditions. Thus, despite the originally impressive goals of the Massey mission in Safia, some locals who once welcomed the Massey military are becoming frustrated and disenchanted with the Massey military's lack of knowledge and technical skills. This weakness has hindered the improvement of the safety and the living conditions for the local Safian population.

Consequently it is also apparent that the terrorist organization has been able to successfully use the technical weaknesses and lack of knowledge of the Massey military mission to its advantage in swaying Safian public opinion, attracting sympathy beyond its traditional support base and even gaining a measure of political legitimacy among some Safians. Indeed, it is the inability of the Massey military to devise and implement plans that addresses the needs and desires of Safians that appears to be a key aspect of the terrorists' rising popularity.

Competence-Based Violation:

In a recent statement the Safian government accused the Massey military of being unable to defeat the terrorists and improve conditions in Safia due to the Massey military's lack of knowledge and technical skills required to assist in rebuilding Safia effectively.

(Post-violation measures)

PLEASE COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONNAIRES.

Complete Questionnaires.

PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO CONTINUE READING SCENARIO.

Apology:

In response to this accusation, the Massey military released a statement admitting that such technical problems have existed in its mission in Safia and apologized for the lack of progress to date. The Massey military also stated that the issues would be addressed and would not happen in the future.

Denial:

In response to this accusation, the Massey military released a statement denying all responsibility for the current problems in Safia, attributing the accusation to "political posturing" by the Safian government in an effort to avoid its own role in this situation.

(Post-repair measures)

PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRES.

E.2   Integrity Violation Scenario

Please read the following scenario, **and imagine yourself in the following situation as a native of the country Safia,** where you and your family are from and are residing.

Background of Safia:

Your country, Safia, has been ravaged for the past two decades by wars, massive poverty, and horrendous crimes against humanity. The life expectancy of your people is 44 years; 53% of the total population lives below the poverty line; the adult literacy rate is 29%; only 3% of women are literate and in some areas less than 1% of the population is literate; one woman dies from pregnancy-related causes every 30 minutes; and one out of five children dies before the age of 5. The average monthly wage in your country is the equivalent of CDN$50, the average monthly rent is CDN$250, and the average monthly food/expenses cost is CDN$250. The scale of poverty in your land has led to massive corruption.

Agriculture is the main occupation, although less than 10% of the land is cultivated; a large percentage of the arable land was damaged by warfare during the 1980s and 1990s. Crops include wheat and other grains, fruits, and nuts. One of Safia's main crops is the cocoa leaf, which has both medicinal and nutritional value. Road conditions throughout Safia are poor; pack animals are an important means of transport within the country.

A few years ago a local terrorist group started to take over your country declaring itself the legitimate government of Safia. The local terrorist group controlled 90% of your country by 2000, but its government was not generally recognized by the international community. In order to deal with the terrorist threat, to assist in rebuilding the nation, and to provide a better quality of life for you and local Safians, the Safian government has asked for assistance from the international community.

The country of Massey responded to that request and several thousand military troops from Massey were deployed to Safia. The Massey military has responded to the Safian government's request not only because Massey is a member state of the United Nations (UN) but also because the volunteer forces of the Massey military have a history of assisting other countries in times of need. The Massey government and military set the following goals for their mission in Safia: the rebuilding and reconstruction of roads, infrastructure and agriculture, and the liberation of the country from the growing domestic terrorist organization. From this public announcement of their goals, you and many of the locals from Safia are expecting significant improvements in security and living conditions in Safia that will be delivered by the Massey military.

PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRES.

Complete Questionnaires. *(Baseline/Pre-Violation Measures)*

PLEASE CONTINUE READING SCENARIO ON NEXT PAGE.

The Situation in Safia since the arrival of the Massey Military:

After 4 years, little progress seems to have been made in the areas of reconstruction, development and security. Recently, the UN Development Programme has stated that, "reconstruction and development is urgently needed otherwise this fragile nation could easily slip back into chaos and abject poverty."

Very little of the Massey military efforts appear to have been directed toward vital development and reconstruction projects. First, out of 21,000 kilometers of roads, only 2,793 kilometers are paved. There are 47 airports, but only 10 have paved runways, and only 3 of them are over 3,047 meters. Although originally taking responsibility to pave the roads in Safia, the Massey military now says that it does not need to honour that commitment.

Second, the Massey military does not allow the workers of the UN and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to travel on the Safian national airline, claiming the Safian national airline to be unsafe, although it can provide no evidence to support this claim. Instead the Massey military recommends the use of non-Safian private airline companies to provide services for foreign workers under the "provision of services for humanitarian, relief and development projects and organizations." This represents a significant amount of revenue as the fares for trips on these non-Safian airlines range from $73 to $1900 (CDN). The Massey military's endorsement of non-Safian airlines versus the local Safian airline takes a significant source of funds away from local Safians and places these badly needed resources into the hands of the non-Safian airline companies. It seems the Massey military is more concerned with establishing favourable financial ties with foreign airline companies than with improving the Safian economy. You and other Safians are outraged at this display of dishonour by the Massey military.

Third, the local Safians who live in urban areas have electricity only a few hours per day, mainly in the evenings. However, the 40 international organizations (e.g., the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the UN, operating in Safia, are supplied with modern equipment, electricity, water and gas by the Massey military. Local Safians are resentful of the fact that after 4 years they do not have consistent access to electricity, gas and clean water, while foreigners enjoy these facilities. The Massey military states that it knows of this discrepancy, but insists that it does not control access to these resources and therefore is unable to give Safians regular access to resources; however, there is overwhelming evidence that the Massey military has full control over access to these resources, but is giving preferential treatment and re-routing resources to foreign organizations (e.g., WTO, NGOs) instead of to the locals. This dishonesty has not been overlooked by the local population.

Fourth, the protection efforts of the Massey military appear to be largely directed toward protecting the international organizations operating in Safia, rather than protecting the local population. In fact, over the last 4 years there have been several credible reports that Massey military operations have led to local Safian civilian fatalities and in some instances have destroyed infrastructure needed for effective aid and development. In response to these accusations the Massey military seems to have intentionally misled Safians to believe that the military is addressing the needs of the Safians, but while actually focusing on the needs of the international organizations.

Fifth, as indicated earlier, Safians use the cocoa leaf to produce tea leaves and sell the leaves for profit, providing them with a source of income. However, the cocoa leaf has also been used by terrorists to make illegal drugs (i.e., cocaine), which provides a source of funding for their insurgency. In response, the Massey military has implemented a policy of forced cocoa leaf eradication. This policy not only removes a source of funding for the terrorists, but also has a negative effect on Safians by destroying the local Safians' source of income without providing them with an alternative livelihood. One year ago the Massey military announced a plan that would monitor and allow a legitimate method for Safian farmers to grow cocoa leaves for tea production while simultaneously eradicating illegal sales of cocoa leaves for cocaine production. A year later it seems that this plan was not implemented because the Massey military intentionally prioritized time and resources to issues related to the international companies that are currently based in Safia, despite the continued deterioration of the Safian financial situation and the desperate need of Safian farmers to find a legitimate method to grow cocoa leaves.

Overall, the inconsistently implemented efforts by the Massey military for development and reconstruction appear to be underfunded and to have failed to achieve any significant impact on Safians' living conditions. Thus, despite the originally impressive goals of the Massey mission in Safia, some locals who once welcomed the Massey military are becoming frustrated and disenchanted with the Massey military's apparent lack of integrity in honouring its stated commitments to the government and people of Safia, while instead intentionally focusing on the needs and interests of the international companies currently in Safia.

Consequently, it is also apparent that the terrorist organization has been able to successfully use the lack of honour and honesty by the Massey military to its advantage in swaying Safian public opinion, attracting sympathy beyond its traditional support base and even gaining a measure of political legitimacy among some Safians. Indeed, the lack of honour and integrity of the Massey military in dealing with the needs of Safians appears to be a key aspect of the terrorists' rising popularity in Safia.

Integrity-Based Violation:

In a recent statement the Safian government accused the Massey military of being unable to defeat the terrorists and improve conditions in Safia. According to the Safian government the Massey military's complicit nature, as evidenced by its support of foreign companies making profits from the suffering of Safians, clearly shows that the Massey military had never had the intention to provide the level of assistance they had promised to provide and should be providing.

(Post-violation measures)

Trust Repair:

Apology:

In response to this accusation, the Massey military released a statement admitting such problems existed and apologized for the lack of progress to date. The Massey military also stated that the issues would be addressed and would not happen again in the future.

Denial:

In response to this accusation, the Massey military released a statement denying all responsibility for the current problems in Safia, attributing the accusation to "political posturing" by the Safian government in an effort to avoid its own role in this situation.

(Post-repair measures)

E.3   No Violation (Control) Scenario

Please read the following scenario, and **imagine yourself in the following situation as a native of the country Safia,** where you and your family are from and are residing.

Background of Safia:

Your country, Safia, has been ravaged for the past two decades by wars, massive poverty, and horrendous crimes against humanity. The life expectancy of your people is 44 years; 53% of the total population lives below the poverty line; the adult literacy rate is 29%; only 3% of women are literate and in some areas less than 1% of the population is literate; one woman dies from pregnancy-related causes every 30 minutes; and one out of five children dies before the age of 5. The average monthly wage in your country is the equivalent of CDN$50, the average monthly rent is CDN$250, and the average monthly food/expenses cost is CDN$250. The scale of poverty in your land has led to massive corruption.

Agriculture is the main occupation, although less than 10% of the land is cultivated; a large percentage of the arable land was damaged by warfare during the 1980s and 1990s. Crops include wheat and other grains, fruits, and nuts. One of Safia's main crops is the cocoa leaf, which has both medicinal and nutritional value. Road conditions throughout Safia are poor; pack animals are an important means of transport within the country.

A few years ago a local terrorist group started to take over your country declaring itself the legitimate government of Safia. The local terrorist group controlled 90% of your country by 2000, but its government was not generally recognized by the international community. In order to deal with the terrorist threat, to assist in rebuilding the nation, and to provide a better quality of life for you and local Safians, the Safian government has asked for assistance from the international community.

The country of Massey responded to that request and several thousand military troops from Massey were deployed to Safia. The Massey military has responded to the Safian governments request not only because Massey is a member state of the United Nations (UN) but also because the volunteer forces of the Massey military have a history of assisting other countries in times of need. The Massey government and military set the following goals for their mission in Safia: the rebuilding and reconstruction of roads, infrastructure and agriculture, and the liberation of the country from the growing domestic terrorist organization. From this public announcement of their goals, you and many of the locals from Safia are expecting significant improvements in security and living conditions in Safia that will be delivered by the Massey military.

PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRES.

Complete Questionnaires. *(Baseline/Pre-Violation Measures)*

PLEASE CONTINUE READING SCENARIO ON NEXT PAGE.

The Situation in Safia since the arrival of the Massey Military:

After 4 years, progress has been made. Recently, the UN Development Programme has stated that, "reconstruction and development is progressing well giving Safia the opportunity to become a stable country. The Massey military has invested a sufficient amount of resources to vital development and reconstruction efforts."

First, out of 21,000 kilometers of roads, 18, 654 kilometers are paved. There are 47 airports, and a majority have paved runways. Overall progress is being made with respect to reconstruction and development. Thus it is evident that the Massey military is fulfilling its original commitment to take the lead in paving the roads in Safia.

Second, the Massey military allow the workers of the UN and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to travel on the Safian national airline, because they have deemed the airline to be safe. In addition, a number of non-Safian private airline companies provide services for foreign workers under the "provision of services for humanitarian, relief and development projects and organizations." This puts a significant source of revenue directly into the hands of the Safians. You and other Safians see this is as but one example of the effective role that the Massey military forces have played in reconstruction, demonstrating the effectiveness of their mission.

Third, the locals living in urban areas have electricity. The 40 international organizations, including the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the UN, which are operating in Safia, are also supplied with electricity, water and gas by the Massey military. Local Safians are pleased to see that after 4 years of not having access to electricity, gas and clean water, presently Safians and foreigners are enjoying these facilities.

Fourth, the protection efforts of the Massey military appear to be largely directed toward protecting the safety of the Safian people, as well as protecting the international organizations operating in Safia. Furthermore, over the last 4 years Massey military actions have led to a decrease in local Safian civilian fatalities and greater aid and development. In response, the local Safians continue to give their support to the Massey military.

Fifth, while the cocoa leaf may be used to make tea, and is a legitimate source of income for Safian farmers, it may also be used by the terrorist organization to make income from cocaine. Previously, there had been a policy of forced cocoa leaf eradication, which while controlling cocaine production, also had the effect of destroying the local Safian farmers' source of income without providing them with an alternative livelihood. The Massey military has removed this cocoa leaf eradication policy in order to allow Safians to maintain their source of income through producing cocoa tea. The Massey military has managed to maintain the local livelihoods of Safians by allowing cocoa leaf production to continue in the areas under its control, while simultaneously preventing the terrorist organization from manufacturing cocaine.

Overall, the consistently implemented efforts by the Massey military for development and reconstruction appear to be well funded and to have achieved a significant impact on Safians' living conditions. Thus, the Massey military has delivered on many promises of a better life made to the local people of Safia. Overall, the Massey military has reasonably achieved its reconstruction goals in Safia.

Consequently, it is also apparent that the terrorist organization has not been able to exploit any issues with, or weaknesses of, the Massey military to its advantage in swaying Safian public opinion, and has been unsuccessful in attracting sympathy beyond its traditional support base and unable to gain a measure of political legitimacy among many Safians. Indeed, the success of the Massey military in meeting the needs of Safians appears to be a key aspect of the terrorists' declining popularity.

No Violation (control):

In a recent statement the Safian government stated that the Massey military has been making progress in defeating the terrorist organization and improving conditions in Safia.

PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRES.

Complete Questionnaires.

PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO CONTINUE READING SCENARIO.

("Post-violation" measures)

No Trust Repair (control):

In response to the above statement, senior Massey military officials have responded with appreciation for the acknowledgement of their achievements.

("Post-repair" measures)

PLEASE SEE RESEARCHER TO COMPLETE QUESTIONNAIRES.

Annex F   Questionnaires

Please read the following three questions and circle the response you believe to be correct.

(Manipulation Checks: To be administered post-repair) (Kim et al., 2004)

1. **In the scenario you read, the Massey military was accused of being unable to defeat the insurgency and improve conditions of Safia due to:**

a) its inadequate knowledge/technical skills required to complete tasks effectively
b) intentionally not providing the level of assistance it should be providing
c) it was not accused of anything

2. **What does this accusation bring into question:**

a) primarily the Massey military's technical ability (e.g., knowledge)
b) primarily the Massey military's integrity
c) Not applicable (there was no accusation)

3. **What was the Massey military's response to the accusation:**

a) admitted responsibility and apologized for the infraction
b) denied the accusation completely
c) didn't admit/deny the allegation as there was no allegation

Based on what you have read in the scenario thus far, and using the scale below, please answer each of the following questions while imagining yourself **to be a local Safian**. There are no right or wrong answers.

(Trust Beliefs: To be administered baseline, post-violation, and post-repair) (Mayer & Davis, 1995)

A.
1. The Massey military is very capable of performing its job.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

2. The Massey military is highly skilled in the work that needs to be done on the job.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

3. I feel very confident about the skills and abilities of the Massey military.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

4. The Massey military possesses the skills and abilities to be successful at the things it tries to do.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

5. The Massey military has specialized capabilities that can improve conditions in Safia.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

6. The Massey military is technically well qualified.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

B.

1. The Massey military is very concerned about the welfare of Safians.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

2. Safians' needs and desires are very important to the Massey military.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

3. The Massey military would not knowingly do anything to hurt Safians.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

4. The Massey military really looks out for what is important to Safians.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly						Strongly
Disagree						Agree

5. The Massey military will go out of its way to help Safians.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly						Strongly
Disagree						Agree

C.

1. The Massey military has a strong sense of justice.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly						Strongly
Disagree						Agree

2. Safians never have to wonder whether the Massey military will stick to its word.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly						Strongly
Disagree						Agree

3. The Massey military tries hard to be fair in dealings with others.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly						Strongly
Disagree						Agree

4. Sound principles and ethics seem to guide the behavior of the Massey military.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly						Strongly
Disagree						Agree

5. I like the values of the Massey military.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

6. The Massey military's actions and behaviors are very consistent.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

(Trust Intention: To be administered baseline, post-violation, and post-repair) (Mayer & Davis, 1995)

A.

1. I would let the Massey military continue to have influence over issues that are important to me for the duration of its mission here.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

2. I would be willing to let the Massey military have continuing control over my future in Safia until Safia reaches stability.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

3. I do not need to keep an eye on the behaviors of the Massey military.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

4. I would be comfortable giving the Massey military a task or problem that was critical to me, even if I could not monitor its actions.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

(Expectations Pre-Violation: To be administered baseline) (Brown et al., 2008)

1. The Massey military is likely to perform with professionalism.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

2. The Massey military is likely to act in ways consistent with a professional military code of conduct.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

3. The Massey military shares my beliefs and values.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

4. The Massey military is likely to have good training.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

5. The Massey military is likely to have a high level of experience.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

6. The Massey military and local Safians are likely to work well together.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

7. The Massey military is likely to have a good reputation.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

(Willingness to Risk: To be administered post-violation and post-repair)
(Brown et al., 2008)

B.

If asked to be in a high risk situation with the Massey military, I would be willing:

1. to rely on it to 'watch my back'/take care of me.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

2. to rely on it to keep my best interests in mind.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

3. to rely on it to protect me.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

4. to rely on it to do the right thing.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

5. to rely on it to behave predictably.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

6. to rely on it to do what it says it is going to do.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

7. I believe it would look out for me.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly

(Expectations Post-Violation: To be administered post-violation and post- repair) (Brown et al., 2008)

1. The Massey military performed with professionalism.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

2. The behavior of the Massey military was consistent with a professional military's code of conduct.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

3. The Massey military seems to share my beliefs and values.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

4. The Massey military seems to have good training.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

5. The Massey military seems to have a high level of experience and ability.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

6. The Massey military and Safians worked well together.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

7. The Massey military has a good reputation.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree

Annex G   Debriefing

DEBRIEFING FORM FOR HUMAN SUBJECT PARTICIPATION

Title: Understanding the Relationship between Military Organizations and a Local Population
Principal Investigator: Dr. Ritu M. Gill, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto
Co-Investigators: Dr. Angela R. Febbraro, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto; Dr. Megan Thompson, Defence R&D Canada (DRDC) - Toronto; Ms. Marissa Barnes, York University
Thrust: 12og, JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain: Implications for the Tactical Commander (Applied Research Project in Land Command Thrust, PG2)

Dear Participant:

Thank you for having completed this experiment.

For this experiment you were asked to imagine yourself in a scenario and complete a series of questionnaires designed to assess your perceptions in response to the scenario. Specifically we described a fictitious country, Safia, which had been devastated by the effects of an insurgency. In response to a call by the Safian government, the Massey government (also fictitious) deployed troops to assist in defeating the insurgency, in reconstruction and development, and in restoring human rights. The scenario then went on to describe a series of events that had taken place since the arrival of the Massey troops.

The goal of this study is to begin to better understand the relations between military organizations and the local population being assisted, in particular since foreign military organizations have entered complex theatres of operations, such as Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Africa. In such complex missions a variety of setbacks can and have occurred. Local populations receiving support from military organizations have initially responded to such assistance with trust and support; however, over time, a decrease in trust and support has in some cases been noted (Senlis Council, 2007; van der Kloet, 2006).

More specifically this study is designed to gain insight into the responses to particular types of trust violations between military organizations, such as the Canadian Forces, and the local population being assisted. A second goal of this study is to determine which trust repair responses are optimal for restoring trust. Thus, this study will aim to provide information on how to repair trust violations effectively between military organizations and the local population being assisted.

The questionnaires that you completed will be used to measure various dimensions of trust, including trust intentions, trust beliefs, and willingness to risk in the future. We are interested in assessing how dimensions of trust may vary according to what type of trust violation and trust repair mechanism you experienced. Specifically, there is some recent research that has suggested that, in some cases, denial is a more effective trust repair mechanism than is an apology (e.g., for an integrity violation), whereas in other cases an apology is a more effective trust repair mechanism than denial (e.g., for a competence violation) (Kim, Cooper, Ferrin, & Dirks, 2004).

We are particularly interested in seeing if these sorts of findings are applicable in the case of the trust violations that can occur during the complexity of international military engagements.

Risks and Benefits

There are minimal anticipated physical, social, psychological, economic, or other risks associated with this research. The potential benefits of participation in this research include gaining insight into one's perceptions of the relationship between military organizations and the local population they are assisting, as well as insight into the nature of trust development in complex security environments.

Further reading

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List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms

ANOVA   Analysis of Variance

CDN   Canadian

CF   Canadian Forces

DRDC   Defence Research and Development Canada

HREC   Human Research Ethics Committee

JIMP   Joint, Interagency, Multinational, Public

NGOs   Non-Governmental Organizations

PG2   Partner Group 2

RCMP   Royal Canadian Mounted Police

SDs   Standard Deviations

UK   United Kingdom

UN   United Nations

URPP   Undergraduate Research Participant Pool

US   United States

WTO   World Trade Organization

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(U) Establishing and maintaining trust between military organizations and the local population being assisted is considered to be integral to the success of international military operations. A lack of trust in military organizations on the part of the indigenous population may strain the relationship between these two groups, a situation which may, in turn, jeopardize mission success and undermine the military's ability to provide support and assistance to the indigenous population, as well as increase a volatile security situation on the ground. Recent research in the organizational psychology literature has found that in some cases (e.g., an integrity–based trust violation), denial of responsibility is a more effective trust repair mechanism (vs. apology), whereas in other cases (e.g., a competence–based trust violation), an apology is a more effective trust repair mechanism (vs. denial). Still other research has found that an apology is more effective than denial in restoring image and cooperation. This study examined the applicability of these findings to complex international military engagements using a scenario–based experimental paradigm. Results demonstrated that the best trust–related outcomes occur in the absence of trust violations. However, in contrast to previous research, where trust violations did occur, it appears that the most effective trust repair strategy is an apology rather than a denial, although it is important to note that the means for trust measures following either repair strategy remained low in comparison to no trust violation (i.e., the control condition).

(U) L'établissement et le maintien de la confiance entre les organisations militaires et les populations locales auxquelles elles viennent en aide sont considérés comme essentiels à la réussite des opérations militaires internationales. Le manque de confiance de la population locale envers les organisations militaires peut créer des tensions dans les relations entre les deux groupes et, du même coup, mettre en péril la mission, affecter la capacité des militaires d'offrir du soutien et de l'aide à la population locale et accroître les défis posés par le contexte de sécurité instable sur le terrain. Selon des études récemment publiées en psychologie organisationnelle, dans certains cas (p. ex., un manquement à l'intégrité), la dénégation serait un mécanisme de restauration de la confiance plus efficace que la présentation d'excuses, tandis que dans d'autres cas (p. ex., un manquement à la compétence), la présentation d'excuses serait plus efficace que la dénégation. D'autres études indiquent que la présentation d'excuses est plus efficace que la dénégation pour le rétablissement de l'image et de la coopération. La présente étude visait à évaluer l'applicabilité de ces observations aux engagements militaires internationaux complexes à l'aide d'un paradigme expérimental fondé sur des scénarios. Les observations ont montré que les meilleurs résultats pour la confiance sont obtenus en l'absence de bris de confiance. Cependant, contrairement à ce qui a été noté dans les recherches précédentes, où il y a eu des bris de confiance, il semble que la meilleure stratégie pour rétablir la confiance est la présentation d'excuses et non la dénégation, bien qu'il importe de préciser que les valeurs moyennes des mesures de la confiance restaient peu élevées après l'une ou l'autre des stratégies de restauration de la confiance comparativement aux scénarios sans bris de confiance (groupe témoin).

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(U) Trust restoration, military, indigenous population

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